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Abstract 
This paper presents a quantitative approach to operational risk modeling and estimation of safety integrity levels, required for the deep 
water electric work class remotely operated vehicle with reference to ROSUB6000 developed by the National Institute of Ocean Technology, 
India. ROSUB6000 is used for carrying out bathymetric surveys, gas hydrate surveys, poly-metallic nodule exploration, salvage operations, 
and meeting emergency response situations. The system is expected to be in operation for a period of 300 h per year, and has to be extremely 
safe and reliable. Methods and models for the quantitative assessment of operational safety and estimation of safety integrity levels for ROV 
are seldom available in the deep water intervention industry. The safety instrumented functions implemented in the ROV should be able to 
meet the SIL requirements of specific mission. This study indicates that the required safety factors are implemented into the design of the 
state-of-the-art ROV ROSUB 6000, considering IEC 61508/61511 recommendations on Health, Safety and Environment and it is found that 
the system is able to meet the required SIL for seven identified functions. This paper gives the design and safety engineers in the ROV 
industry, an overview of the numerical operational risk assessment methods and safety-centered ROV engineering. 
© 2016 Shanghai Jiaotong University. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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(. Introduction 
Work class remotely operated vehicle (ROV) support is
ound to be highly essential in the oil and gas sector [1] ,
eep water research, and offshore energy sectors [1] where
he oil and gas sector is accountable for 75% of ROV usage in
rilling, exploration and subsea infrastructural developments 
2] . The global annual expenditure on work class ROV op-
rations is set to increase from $1.6 billion in 2013 to $2.4
illion in 2017, a compounded annual growth rate of 11.3%
1] . The world fleet of work class ROVs has grown from 641
nits in 2011 [3] to 1102 units in 2013 [4] . This is largely
ue to the move toward deeper waters and more complicated
ffshore field development programs [5–8] . The essential use
f work class ROV in deeper water was clearly demonstrated∗ Corresponding author. 
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 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). uring the Macondo well head blow-out in the Gulf of Mex-
co [9] which demanded safe and reliable operation in the
hallenging environment. This demands the need for relevant
afety standards and procedures to be implemented in the
ast growing subsea intervention industry, where the vehicle
isk tolerance levels and associated safety requirements are
ictated by the mission for which the vehicle operations are
alled. The required safety levels for the intervention system
re normally dictated by the Health, Safety and Environmental
HSE) regulations already in place which is usually described
y the safety integrity levels (SIL) based on IEC 61508 and
1511 standards [10–12] and the operational SIL of the ROV
eeds to be in compliant with the required SIL. Thus a quan-
itative, risk based, operation specific assessment of the vehi-
le’s SIL is required, so as to ensure confidence in the use
f ROV for the specific operation. Even though, safety as-
essment by qualitative methods for the required safety levels
n offshore environments [13] and surface vessels [14] exist,
uch methods are seldom practiced in the ROV industry where is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
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Fig. 1. View of the ROSUB 6000 system prior to launch. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Electrical and control architecture of the ROSUB 6000 system. 
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o  safety assessment has a high level of uncertainty due to the
insufficient reported failure data which has been a major con-
cern for risk related decision support. Novel decision making
techniques are required to make the design and operation de-
cisions efficiently and in the absence of which, it might be
difficult to compare the design costs and operational benefits.
Thus, the need for suitable risk assessment and quantitative
safety models based on HSE are required. The CAPEX and
OPEX of the ROV are decided by the frequency of mainte-
nance required to upkeep the SIL. Thus the maintenance ex-
penditure could be greatly reduced by safety centered design
practices. This paper presents an approach to the operational
safety modeling and estimation of SIL for deep water electric
work class ROV, with reference to the ROSUB 6000 designed
by the National Institute of Ocean Technology (NIOT). 
2. System description 
NIOT has developed an electric work class ROVROSUB
6000 for carrying out deep sea operations such as bathymetric
surveys, gas hydrate surveys [15,16] , poly-metallic nodule ex-
ploration [17] and salvage operations. The ROSUB 6000 sys-
tem comprises of a remotely operable vehicle (ROV), tether
management system (TMS), launching and recovery system
(LARS), ship systems, control console, instrumentation, con-
trol and electrical system, control and operational system
[15,18] .The vehicle is equipped with two electrically pow-
ered hydraulic actuated manipulators, which can handle a pay
load of 150 kg intended for mounting scientific and mission
oriented systems. 
Fig. 1 shows the overall architecture, where the work-class
ROV and the TMS are docked together, and ready for launch
from the mother vessel, using the LARS. 6000 m of umbili-
cal cable is housed in a hydraulically operable deck storage
winch, and its operation is synchronized with the LARS. The
LARS handles the ROV-TMS docked system and undocks
it below the splash zone. As the system reaches the desired
depth, the ROV is caged out of the TMS. The ROV is pro-
pelled by thrusters, and can be operated in any desired direc-
tion from the pilot command from the ship. Manipulators aresed to carry out subsea tasking operations. After the com-
letion of the task the ROV shall be docked back to the TMS
ubsea and the system is recovered to the ship. 
Fig. 2 indicates the power and control system architecture
n the TMS, ROV and the ship. Ship power at 400 V and
0 Hz is transformed into 6600 V and 460 Hz using a stan-
ard frequency converter and a step up transformer. Electro-
ptical connectivity between the ship and TMS is achieved
y a 6000 m umbilical cable. The connectivity between the
MS and ROV is realized by the 400 m long tether cable, and
 ruggedized pressure compensated medium voltage switch
19] . Subsea power converters in the TMS and the ROV con-
ert 6600 V at 460 Hz to the power level required for the sub-
ystems. The system was developed with the aim of carrying
ut 300 h of deep sea operations per year, with reliability as
he key driver, and was identified to have an MTBF of 4.9
ears and 6.2 years for ROV-TMS docking and manipulator
perations respectively [6–8] . Since its inception in 2007, the
ystem has undergone 37 dives, of which 13 dives were at
epths greater than 1000 m [6–8] . 
The design depth qualification of the system was carried
ut at the polymetallic nodule site at the Central Indian Ocean
N. Vedachalam et al. / Journal of Ocean Engineering and Science 1 (2016) 109–118 111 
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Table 1 
Major standards followed for the reliability study to calculate failure rates. 
Component Standards 
CPU,AC-DC Converters, DC-DC Converters, Fuses, 
Electronics and Optical connectors, Ethernet 
Converters, Data and video multiplexers, Input and 
Output modules for Data acquisition cards 
FIDES 
HF Converters and Transformers, Isolators, Motors, MIL and IEEE 
Power Contactors, halogen lamps MIL 
Umbilical and Tether cables, terminations, subsea 
sensors 
OREDA 
O-rings and seals NSWC 
Table 2 
Failure-in-time values for major sub-components for the defined mission 
period. 
Component and its failure in time 
Umbilical cable [6–8] 700 
Tether cable [6–8] 438 
TMS based subsea electro-optic slip ring [6–8] 2220 
Data multiplexer in TMS/ROV [6–8] 381 
Real time controller [6–8] 1284 
Photonic inertial navigation system (PHINS) [6–8] 33,333 
Sea battery [6–8] 3140 
Water entry detection circuit [6–8] 5 
Medium voltage switch [19,22] 500 
Transformer [23] 673 
Motor [22] 376 
Hydraulic pump [6–8] 376 
Subsea power and optical connectors [24] 143, 244 
Note : ∗FIT in Billion hours = (number of failures/number of units x operating 
hours) x 10 9 . 
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Pasin at a depth of 5289 m during April 2010, and the system
as been used for scientific exploration in the SONNE field
n the South Central Indian ridge during April 2013, where
 near real time underwater video was streamed from the
odriguez triple junction [20] . 
. Methodology and standards followed 
The following is the list of the major standards followed, 
1. FIDES Guide [21] for estimation of failure rate of elec-
tronic components and systems considering the mission
specifications. 
2. MIL HDBK 217F, Military handbook for Reliability Es-
timation of Electronics Equipment [22] for estimation of
failure rate of electric components and electronic compo-
nents. 
3. IEEE 493 IEEE Recommended practice [23] for Design
of reliable Industrial and Commercial Power Systems for
the failure rate calculation of electric and electronic com-
ponents. 
4. OREDA Handbook [24] for ruggedized mechanical com-
ponents, considering the operating conditions based on the
mission. 
5. Functional Safety – A Straightforward guide to applying
IEC 61508 and related standards [10,25] for obtaining the
hazardous events and SIF. 
6. IEC61511 [11,12] for estimating the methodology of the
operating SIL level requirements. 
7. Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) standards for Pre-
diction of reliability for mechanical equipment [26] . 
The failure rate determination was done by the following
ethods, 
a. Based on the manufacturers’ data and interpretation suit-
able for the mission profile. 
b. For systems where detailed drawings and schematics are
available, using component failure data from the respective
standards, failure rates are calculated taking mission pro-
file, operating conditions and stresses into consideration. 
c. For commercially sourced components, where there is no
adequate information, based on the functional specification,
the failure rate for the mission profile, is calculated using
standards. 
The standards were based on feedbacks from operations
nd existing failure models along with statistical interpreta-
ions over the normal operating life period of the involved
ystems, considering the influence of the operating temper-
ture, amplitude and frequency of the temperature changes,
ibration amplitude, humidity and operating stresses during
ifferent mission profiles [21] accounting for the manufactur-
ng and integrating quality factor, for computing the failure
ates. The standards also support the commercially off the
helf (COTS) approach for calculating the failure rates of the
ystems for the defined mission profile with the functionalequirements, and the mission profile as an input from the
ser. For subsystems the failure rates are computed from the
omponent level. Table 1 gives the standards followed for
he major systems and components. The TOTAL-SATODEV 
RIF tool is used for determining the SIL levels. Table 2
etails the Failure in Time data of the major systems. The
ndicated FIT values are adopted suitably for computations. 
. Operational risk assessment and SIL determination 
ethodology 
IEC 61508 is a standard [10,25,27] , which is essentially
 framework for implementing instrumented safety systems
sing the principles of Safety Life Cycle and Safety Integrity
evel concepts. Protection systems need to perform their in-
ended operations on demand. The probability of failure is the
navailability of a safety system on demand. If a demand oc-
urs after a time, the probability that the system has already
ailed is the probability of failure on demand (PFD). SIL de-
nes the degree of safety protection required by the process,
nd consecutively the safety reliability of the safety system
ecessary to achieve the function. SIL has four levels, 1 to 4.
he higher the safer. Table 3 describes the various SIL levels
ith the corresponding PFD ( Table 4 ). 
FD = Tolerable frequency of the accident 
Frequency of the accident with no protection 
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Table 3 
Safety integrity levels and corresponding PFD. 
Safety integrated Probability of failure on 
level (SIL) demand (PFD per year) 
1 10 −1 –10 −2 
2 10 −2 –10 −3 
3 10 −3 –10 −4 
4 10 −4 –10 −5 
Table 4 
Factors for SIF demand rate selection. 
Demand rate Factor (W) 
W9 Often > 1/year 9 
W8 Frequent 1/1–3 year 8 
W7 Likely 1/ 3–10 year 7 
W6 Probable 1/10–30 year 6 
W5 Occasional 1/30–100 year 5 
W4 Remote 1/100–300 year 4 
W3 Improbable 1/300–1000 year 3 
Table 5 
Consequence parameter selection criteria. 
Consequence F + P + W 
Severity level C 1,2 3,4 5,6 7,8 9,10 11,12 
Catastrophic F NR IL1 IL2 IL3 IL4 NA 
Extensive E NR NR IL1 IL2 IL3 IL4 
Serious D NR NR NR IL1 IL2 IL3 
Considerable C NR NR NR NR IL1 IL2 
Marginal B NR NR NR NR NR IL1 
Negligible A NR NR NR NR NR NR 
Note : NR, not required; IL, integrity level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Risk level assignment data. 
Personnel health Environment Financial 
Consequence ∗ Extensive Marginal Serious 
∗ Catastrophic, Extensive, Serious, Considerable, Marginal, Negligible. 
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a  Based on IEC 61508, the SIL requirements are computed
taking into consideration the risk consequence, alternate SIF
in place, human occupancy and the demand rate for the SIF.
a. Avoidance parameter P 
The parameter takes values of 0 or 1. Based on the avail-
ability or unavailability of the alternate SIF, the parameter
is assigned a value of 0 or 1 respectively. 
b. Occupancy parameter F 
Based on the human occupancy the parameter takes the
values of 2, 1 and 0 corresponding to continuous, occa-
sional and rare human presence in the mission. 
c. Demand rate parameter W 
This parameter defines the number of times per year that
the hazardous event could occur in the absence of SIF. 
Having computed the values of P , F and W , the summed
up values are plotted against the consequence factor, to obtain
the required level of SIL for the SIF. The same is shown in
Table. 5. 
Table 6 shows the values taken as the input for the risk
consequence parameters based on the risk tolerance capacity
of NIOT. 
FMECA [6] studies done on ROSUB 6000 reveal that the
following failures are critical from the HSE point of view, 1. Injury to the operating personnel and damage to the system
and environment due to system electrical insulation failure
and its consequences. 
2. Damage to the system due to water leakages inside sealed
pressure cases in ROV. 
3. Damage to the system due to water leakages inside sealed
pressure cases in TMS. 
4. ROV hard landing on the sea floor during operations. 
5. TMS –ROV tether cable damage. 
6. ROV-TMS docking. 
7. Manipulator operation. 
. Risk graph matrix for the safety instrumented functions 
Risk graph matrix shown in Table 7 is made specifically for
he ROSUB 6000 system to_ identify the SIL levels required
rom the HSE point of view [11,12,28] . 
In order to meet the unsafe events, appropriate Safety in-
trumented functions (SIF) are implemented. The following
opics details the SIL levels achieved for the implemented
IF. 
.1. Determination of SIL for implemented SIF 
SIF 1: Electrical Insulation monitoring 
As indicated in Table 7 , HSE demands that the safety in-
trumented function (SIF) [27] implemented should comply
ith SIL2 levels. The on-line electrical insulation monitor-
ng system installed in the ship side monitors the insulation
ealthiness of the 6.6 kV circuits, including the umbilical ca-
le, tether cable, and associated in-line electrical components.
henever an unsafe low insulation condition is detected, the
onitoring system switches off the power input to the system.
he architecture of the same is shown in Fig. 3 . The failure
ate of the implemented SIF is computed to be 4250FIT and
ig. 4 shows the achieved SIL which is in line with the cal-
ulated HSE requirements, for a proof test interval (PTI) of
.5 years. The maintenance of the SIF hardware every 5.5
ears, shall keep the PFD of the SIF at the SIL2 level. 
SIF 2: Water entry detection in ROV power and telemetry
ressure cases 
The communication link between ROV and rest of the sys-
ems is shown in Fig. 5 . ROV power and electronics systems
re kept inside sealed pressure cases and the connections are
stablished using penetrators and feed through with O-rings
or water tight integrity. The life time of the seals depends on
he operating stresses such as pressure and temperature, qual-
ty of the material and the frequency of utilizations [29,30] .
he failure or degradation of the O-rings leads to water leak-
ge into the enclosure, which leads to economic losses. As
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Table 7 
SIL requirement determination chart for the identified unsafe event. 
SIF No Event Description of implemented Consequence Influence Demand Likelisum Integrity 
safety instrumented 
function (SIF) 
Type C F P W Sum IL 
1 6 kV electricity hazard due to 
insulation failure in the high 
voltage handling systems. 
On-line Insulation 
healthiness monitoring 
system 
H D 2 1 6 9 IL2 
E B 1 1 6 8 NR 
F C 1 1 6 8 NR 
2 Water entry into ROV data 
telemetry and thruster pressure 
case 
Water entry detector system 
installed 
H A 0 1 5 6 OK 
E A 1 1 5 7 OK 
F D 0 1 6 7 IL1 
3 Water entry into TMS pressure 
case 
Water entry detector system 
installed 
H A 0 1 5 6 OK 
E A 1 1 5 7 OK 
F D 0 1 6 7 IL1 
4 ROV hard landing on the sea 
bed 
Decision making control 
algorithm implemented 
using depth sensor 
H A 0 1 5 6 OK 
E A 1 1 5 7 OK 
F D 0 1 6 7 IL1 
5 TMS - ROV tether cable 
damage 
Cable twist monitoring 
mechanism to aid docking 
function 
H A 0 1 5 6 OK 
E A 1 1 5 7 OK 
F D 0 1 6 7 IL1 
6 ROV-TMS docking failure System hardware involved in 
the operation with 
man-in-loop 
H A 0 1 6 7 OK 
E A 1 1 6 8 OK 
F D 0 1 9 10 IL2 
7 ROV manipulator failure System hardware involved in 
the operation with 
man-in-loop 
H A 0 1 6 7 OK 
E A 1 1 6 8 OK 
F D 0 1 9 10 IL2 
H, Health; E, Environment; F, financial loss. 
Fig. 3. Online system insulation monitor. 
Fig. 4. SIL calculation chart for electrical system insulation protection. 
Fig. 5. Schematic of the ROV-TMS-Ship communication interfaces. 
i  
m  
b  
e  ndicated in Table 7 , HSE demands that the SIF to be imple-
ented should comply with SIL1 levels. SIF is implemented
y using a water entry detector inside the enclosures. When-
ver water entry is detected by the detectors, the control sys-
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Fig. 6. Trees used for calculating the PLC and communication network FIT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Schematic indicating subsea system–ship power system interface. 
Fig. 8. ROV and TMS having independent heading. 
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item in the ROV, switches off the operating command to the
thrusters and pump, and issues a request to the TMS controller
to open the MV switch. Fig. 6 shows the failure trees for the
control system having a failure rate of 27000 FIT and com-
munication interfaces. The maintenance of the SIF hardware
every 6.5 years will keep the PFD of the SIF at the SIL1 level.
SIF 3: Water entry detection in TMS telemetry pressure
case 
The communication link between TMS and the rest of
the systems is shown in Fig. 7 . Similar to ROV, TMS elec-
tronic systems are also kept inside sealed pressure cases, and
the connections are established using penetrators and feed-
through. As indicated in Table 7 , HSE demands that the SIF
to be implemented should comply with SIL1 levels. The SIF
is implemented by using a water entry detector inside the en-
closures. Whenever water entry is detected, the control system
in the TMS issues a request to the ship system to switch off
the main deck input power circuit breaker. The failure rate of
the SIF is 27000 FIT and the maintenance of the SIF hard-
ware every 6.5 years will keep the PFD of the SIF at the
SIL1. 
SIF 4: ROV hard contact with the sea bed 
The LARS and the umbilical storage winch are operated,
such that the ROV-TMS system is taken close to the survey
location of interest, and the ROV is undocked from the TMS.
The ROV is maneuvered by the pilot from the deployment
vessel. In the absence of altitude information or the camera,
there are increased possibilities that the ROV may hit the sea
bed. This is an unsafe condition. As indicated in Table 7 ,
HSE demands that the SIF implemented should comply with
the SIL1. The SIF is implemented using an altimeter, ROV
controller and thrusters. Whenever a low clearance between
the sea bed and the ROV is detected, the control system in
the ROV, switches off the operating command to the top three
thrusters. As the ROV is positively buoyant by 20 kg, it tends
to move up, thus avoiding or reducing the impact with the sea
floor. Once the clearance between the seabed and the ROV in-
creases above the programmed safe limit, the thrusters resume
the position prior to the situation. Based on the HSE require-ents, maintenance of the SIF hardware every 6.5 years will
eep the PFD of the SIF at the SIL1. 
SIF 5: ROV-TMS tether cable failure 
In the subsea location, when the ROV is undocked from
he TMS, the pilot shall maneuver the ROV to the object
f interest. During the process, based on the ROV heading
ith respect to the TMS, the tether cable will be subjected
o twist, and the number of twists depends on the skill of
he pilot, the nature of operation and the condition of the
ea currents. During the operation, ROV and the TMS shall
ndergo heading changes which create twists in the tether
able. The number of twists depends on the relative 360 °
eading counts undergone during the operation and the same
s shown in Fig. 8. 
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Fig. 9. Failure tree showing twist feedback failure probability. 
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Fig. 10. Illuminated camera view of ROV docking to the TMS. 
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t  When the ROV has completed the mission, it shall be
ocked back to the TMS and the operation needs all the re-
eased tether cable to be wound back on the TMS winch
ithout twist. Tether cables are designed to withstand lim-
ted number of twists per meter length. When the number of
wist per meter exceeds the allowable limit, the cable will be
amaged [31] . To avoid cable damage due to twisting, the
ilot has to ensure that there is no residual twist on the ca-
le during docking. To aid in hassle free dock, the following
ensor parameters are monitored by the control system. The
ensors and the control systems are aided by a sea battery
s a redundant power source, so that the monitored informa-
ion is not lost due to a power failure during the docking
nstance. 
i. ROV heading counts which are provided by the PHINS
from the ROV. 
ii. TMS heading counts which are provided by the heading
sensor mounted in the TMS. 
ii. Length of the cable reeled out of the drum, which is pro-
vided by the tether cable layer counter. 
v. Cable tension, which is provided by the pressure sensor
mounted in the winch. 
Fig. 8 shows the information being logged in the pilot
omputer console. As indicated in Table 7 , HSE demands
hat the SIF implemented should comply with the SIL1.
ig. 9 shows the failure trees done to compute the PoF of
wist feedback to the ship side from the ROV which has a
ailure rate of 19000 FIT. It is identified that the maintenance
f the SIF hardware every 8.6 years will keep the PFD of the
IF at the SIL 1. .2. Man-in-the-loop safety instrumented functions 
SIF 6: ROV-TMS docking operation safety 
When the ROV completes the identified mission, it has to
e docked with the TMS in the subsea, and the ROV-TMS
ocked system shall be brought to the subsurface close to the
hip so that the system shall be docked with the LARS in the
plash free subsurface region and be recovered to the deck.
ig. 10 shows the pilot view of the ROV close to the TMS
or just before docking during 2008 operations. 
The ROV pilot carries out the docking process with the
id of camera and lights located in the TMS. The following
s the process sequence in carrying out a successful subsea
ocking process. 
a. Pilot the ROV close to the TMS location. 
b. Level wind the already released tether cable back in the
TMS winch, free from twist, by operating the winch in the
TMS. 
c. Pilot the ROV vertically down the TMS and operate the top
thrusters to produce a downward thrust (normally the ROV
is upward buoyant by 20 kg) in such a way, that the tether
cable is held under minimum tension during winding. 
d. With the minimum tension in the cable, operate the TMS
winch and wind the tether cable in a way that the cable is
wound without any slack. 
e. Continue the winding at a slower pace until the ROV enters
the TMS cone, and gets into the latches (which will be
indicated by the limit switches inside the latches). 
Failure in any of the following results in a ROV-TMS
ocking failure. 
a. TMS docking vision support. 
b. TMS tether winch operation. 
c. ROV operation for docking. 
d. Tether cable twist indication from the TMS. 
e. Human error. 
In such a scenario, the ROV has to be salvaged after bring-
ng it to the water surface. This is done by winding the deck
mbilical cable until the TMS surface and docked with the
ARS. As the ROV is linked with the tether cable, and as it
s positively buoyant, it tends to surface. Fig. 11 shows such a
ondition. This surfacing is detrimental for the ROV and the
eleased tether cable, as there are increased chances of entan-
lement with the ship systems such as thrusters. Recovery of
he ROV and salvaging the ROV to the deck vessel has to be
116 N. Vedachalam et al. / Journal of Ocean Engineering and Science 1 (2016) 109–118 
Fig. 11. View indicating system recovery after a docking failure. 
Fig. 12. Tree indicating probability of failure calculation for ROV-TMS dock- 
ing failure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 13. Typical ROV manipulator in operation (Courtesy Internet and 
MBARI). 
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S  done only by divers. This is an unsafe situation in terms of
equipment and human safety. As indicated in Table 7 , HSE
demands that the SIF implemented which is characterized by
the man-in-the-loop and should comply with the SIL 2. 
From the operational point of view, the following are
considered, 
a. The system clocking 300 h per year. 
b. Ten hours per dive. 
c. Two docking operations per dive. 
This shall result in around 60 docking operations per year.
To have 100 % successful docking operations (i.e., zero PFD),
it is required that the SIF should comply with the SIL2. 
Fig. 12 shows the FIT for ROV – TMS docking failure
computed using a failure tree which has a failure rate of
23350 FIT. The achieved SIL level for the SIF is found to be
in line with the HSE computed requirements of SIL2, subject
to a PTI of 7.6 months. However, as the SIF is characterized
by the man-in-the-loop, the safe and skillful docking oper-
ation ensures the risk to be as low as reasonably possible
(ALARP). 
SIF 7: Manipulator operation safety 
The ROV in the ROSUB6000 is equipped with two ma-
nipulator arms with 5 and 7 functions for carrying out subsea
operation. The manipulators are operated by the personnelrom the control console using joysticks. In addition to
ther vision systems, the manipulator arms are equipped
ith cameras which will give a real time video feedback
o the operating personal. Fig. 13 shows the typical work
lass ROVs with manipulators involved in different kinds of
asks. The subsea operations depend on the mission objective
nd may involve tasks such as electric wet mate connector
ate/ de-mate, pipe line valve operations, pipe line sacrificial
node fixing, etc. Thus the risk involved in these subsea
perations varies widely. Fig. 13 shows the ROV holding
ne end of the wet mate cable connector for mating with the
xed ROV panel. The other end of the cable could be a part
f the permanent subsea installation. When the manipulator
peration fails in this condition, the forced retrieval of the
OV by winding back the tether or main umbilical winch,
ould damage the subsea installation. Thus, the ROV will
e anchored to the subsea installation, with other systems
onnected to the ROV deployment vessel. Such damages
ould turn disastrous for subsea oil and gas wellheads and
anifolds. To mitigate this situation, another intervention
ehicle has to be dispatched for crisis management. Similar
ould be the condition, if the ROV is holding the oil pipe
ine valve which leads to damages and oil leakages. 
The following could lead to manipulator operation failure,
a. Manipulator functional failure. 
b. Hydraulic pump motor electric system failure. 
c. Manipulator operation vision support failure. 
d. Operator error. 
Therefore, the failure of the manipulator system while in
peration is a potentially unsafe scenario. As indicated in
able 7 , HSE demands that the SIF implemented should com-
ly with the SIL2. 
From the operational point of view, considering the diving
requencies mentioned in the ROV-TMS docking operation
ase, could result in not more than 100 manipulator operations
er year. To have 100 % successful manipulator operations
i.e., zero PFD), it is required that the SIF should comply
ith the SIL2. Fig. 14 shows the PoF of the control and power
ystems associated with the manipulator operations which has
orresponding failure rate of 18287 FIT. 
The achieved SIL of the SIF is in line with the calculated
SE requirements subject to a PTI of 10 months. The main-
enance of the SIF hardware every 10 months shall keep the
IF at the SIL2. Thus, the hardware and the control logics
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Fig. 14. Tree showing ROV manipulator control failure. 
Table 8 
Summary of SIL recommended and achieved for each SIF implemented. 
Safety instrumented Failure rate HSE recommended PTI 
function of SIF (FIT) and achieved SIL (years) 
SIF 1 to avoid injury to 
operating personnel and 
damage to system and 
environment due to the 
system’s electrical 
insulation failure and its 
consequences 
4250 SIL2 5 .5 
SIF 2 to avoid damage to 
the system due to water 
leakages inside sealed 
pressure cases in ROV 
25,260 SIL1 6 .5 
SIF 3 to avoid damage to 
the system due to water 
leakages inside sealed 
pressure cases in TMS 
25,260 SIL1 6 .5 
SIF 4 to avoid ROV hard 
landing on the sea floor 
during 
25,260 SIL1 6 .5 
SIF 5 to avoid TMS –ROV 
tether cable damage 
19,000 SIL1 8 .6 
SIF 6 to avoid ROV-TMS 
docking failure 
23,350 SIL2 0 .62 
SIF 7 to avoid manipulator 
operation failure 
18,287 SIL2 0 .83 
i  
t  
s  
a
6
 
a  
f  
c  
m  
e  
s  
S  
Table. 9 
Summary of SIF and the residential period in each SIL zone. 
SIF Residential period in each SIL zone (years) 
SIL 2 SIL1 
SIF1 5 Extended more than 10 years 
SIF2 0.6 5.85 
SIF3 0.6 5.85 
SIF4 0.6 5.85 
SIF5 0.76 7.8 
SIF6 0.57 5.5 
SIF7 0.77 7.9 
m  
t  
o  
s  
d
A
 
S  
a  
c
R
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[  
 
[  
[
[
[
[  
 
 
 nvolved are found to meet the PFD of SIL2. However, as
he SIF is characterized by the man-in-the-loop, the safe and
killful manipulator operation ensures the risk to be as low
s reasonably possible (ALARP). 
. Results and conclusion 
A quantitative approach to the operational risk modeling
nd estimation methods of the safety integrity levels required
or the deep water electric work class remotely operated vehi-
le (ROV) with reference to ROSUB 6000 is discussed. The
ethods and models for the quantitative assessment of op-
rational safety and estimation of safety integrity levels for
pecific ROV operations are detailed. Table 8 summarizes the
IL levels achieved for the seven implemented safety instru-ented functions and Table 9 shows the residential period of
he SIF in each SIL zone. This paper which gives an overview
f the numerical operational risk assessment methods and
afety-centered ROV engineering can serve as guidance for
esign and safety engineers in the ROV industry. 
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